What is the difference between texas judges and the federal judiciary
While paying respects at a memorial outside of NRG Park, some attendees raised more questions about the chaotic scene not even 48 hours prior. Most Popular. Rudy Apodaca: Texas would do well to do away with picking judges in partisan elections for this simple reason From the Editorial Board.
Editorial: Use Veterans Day to draw close to those who served. Editorial: How Houston can solve Barker Reservoir flood pools.
Astros' Carlos Correa named top defensive player in AL. Rockets look to remedy inability to finish tight games. POST Houston's new food hall brings acclaimed chefs, more. If county courts at law are not converted into district courts, the Legislature should at least cease creating new county courts at law having unlimited civil jurisdiction and enact legislation making county court at law jurisdiction uniform throughout the state. Redistrict the District Courts.
Overlapping districts appear to be unique to Texas. If the Judicial Districts Board fails to make a statewide apportionment, the Legislative Redistricting Board is supposed to do the job. The need for comprehensive judicial redistricting would be made more pressing if the statutory county and probate courts were converted to district courts, as is recommended in this paper. But comprehensive redistricting should be done whether or not the statutory trial courts are merged into the district courts.
The Legislature should appropriate funds to the OCA to provide staff to the Judicial Districts Board to accomplish its constitutionally mandated task.
Create a Mechanism for Handling Complex Cases. The federal court system has a four-tier structure, but it also has courts to deal with special kinds of litigation. These states have created complex litigation courts, commercial litigation courts, or business litigation courts to provide focused treatment for the types of cases that often arise in modern litigation.
They have found the courts to be a success. Increas e th e Threshol d fo r Distric t Cour t Jurisdiction. Those cases should be handled by lower trial courts. Furthermore, any steps taken to eliminate overlapping subject-matter jurisdiction would decrease confusion and prevent forum shopping. Historically, constitutional county courts have had limited civil, probate, juvenile, and misdemeanor criminal jurisdiction.
Consequently, in many small counties, the constitutional county court is responsible for probating wills, issuing letters testamentary, and resolving juvenile and misdemeanor criminal matters. Thus, counties currently having a single-county district court or county court at law would continue to have a judge available to probate wills, issue letters testamentary, administer probate and guardianship estates, and handle other matters that sometimes require immediate attention but are outside justice court jurisdiction.
The other counties would have the constitutional county court continue to handle those matters. Under this proposal, a number of constitutional county courts will continue to exercise judicial functions. The jurisdiction of those courts should be made uniform. They should retain jurisdiction of those matters that, historically, justice of the peace courts have not handled, like probate and guardianship cases; but overlapping subject-matter jurisdiction between the justice courts and constitutional county courts should be eliminated.
Eliminate Small Claims Courts. All justices of the peace in Texas also serve as small claims court judges. Justice courts and small claims courts occupy the same facilities, have the same judge, and are served by the same staff. Those must be heard by the justice court—of course, we are talking about the same person acting sometimes as a justice of the peace and sometimes as a small claims judge.
The Act prescribed procedures that are less extensive than the rules applicable in justice courts but not appreciably simpler in actual practice. For example, the Act permits an action to be commenced by filing a simple, sworn statement, but does not permit oral pleadings, which are standard in justice court. Discovery is permitted in justice court, and while it was not expressly permitted at first in small claims courts, it is now.
In other words, outside observers cannot tell the difference between justice courts and small claims courts; the procedure in small claims court is not particularly simpler than in justice court; small claims courts do not have jurisdiction of the smallest claims; and a small claims court judgment cannot be reviewed by the court of appeals, but the same judgment could be reviewed by the court of appeals if it had been rendered by the justice court sitting in the same courtroom.
The same complexity that pervades the entire Texas judicial system applies to the very court that ought to be the most transparent and easy to comprehend. Texas residents need an expeditious and convenient method for resolving relatively small civil disputes. Justice courts have exclusive jurisdiction of all eviction cases, without regard to the amount in controversy.
In the context of significant commercial disputes, the eviction process is antiquated and inappropriate. First, the expedited process, which may be appropriate when seeking the eviction of a person from residential property, is not appropriate in commercial lease disputes in which there is a great deal of money at stake. Second, the landlord who files an eviction action may obtain possession on the seventh day after posting a bond, unless the tenant posts a counterbond.
The Legislature also should direct the Supreme Court to promulgate rules: 1 providing for the removal of commercial eviction cases from, and remand of those cases to, justice courts;. Synopsis of Changes. If the steps suggested above are taken, Texas trial court structure would be reduced from seven types of trial courts to three in some counties and four in others.
The constitutional county courts would not have general civil jurisdiction. Court Administration. Consequently, these administrative officers are not particularly accountable to the Supreme Court or any judicial officer or agency. The Legislature should amend the law to provide that the regional administrative judges are appointed, and can be removed, by the Texas Supreme Court. The regional administrative judge, in turn, should be empowered to appoint the local administrative judges in her district, in consultation with the local judges.
For the courts of appeals, the State pays most of the salaries of the judges and all of the salaries for other court employees, but little else. Municipalities pay all costs associated with municipal courts.
Should Texas join the majority of states and assume the obligation of being the primary funding source for its judicial system? It first should be understood that state government financing of trial courts is not necessarily linked to structural unification of those courts.
Additionally, state government financing of trial courts is not necessarily tied to centralized judicial budgeting. Historically, local financing of the judicial system, except the appellate judiciary, was the norm among the states. By the s, local fiscal problems began to drive the movement toward state financing of the judicial system. Constitutional requirements regarding indigent defense, treatment of juveniles, and protection of the mentally incompetent created a set of large and volatile expenditures that could be imposed by judicial mandate.
The demands of modernized court administration…created demands for various new technologies…Breakdown in family structure caused large expenditures for social support services, counseling, juvenile detention facilities, foster care, and child support enforcement. A collateral effect of social disintegration was the need for more juvenile and adult probation officers. No longer did a court consist of a judge, a reporter, and some clerks. Courts were becoming complex administrative entities.
In other words, judicial decisions and state and federal mandates have significantly increased the burden on the court system and on the local governments that support the court system. If decisions and conditions outside the control of local governments are going to drive the costs of the judicial system, fairness suggests that the local government be relieved of those costs. In sum, the question of whether to shift to the state government the primary responsibility for funding the entire judicial system is both complex and important.
A majority of states rely primarily on state funding because, on the whole, state funding is a much better alternative. Attaining and retaining an independent and experienced judiciary requires, in part, that the judiciary be adequately compensated.
While strong, the judiciary currently faces a challenge that calls for legislative and executive action. The challenge is to fund the judiciary at a level sufficient to retain our most capable and experienced judges. Texas is losing judges at all levels of the judiciary due, at least in part, to salaries that have not kept pace with the times…[L]et us admit to ourselves that the judiciary suffers from the loss of their expertise, integrity, and experience.
Texans deserve to walk into a Texas courtroom knowing that their cases will be heard by women and men of talent and experience, judges who have been recruited from among the most capable and successful lawyers. I want all Texans in every area of the state, and all litigants from outside the state who are properly before Texas courts, to have access to a judiciary that includes the most capable, the most dedicated, and the most knowledgeable and experienced.
At the time Chief Justice Jefferson delivered this address to the Legislature, Texas ranked thirty-ninth in its compensation of the judges on its courts of last resort, thirty-fourth in its compensation of intermediate appellate court judges, and twenty-eighth in its compensation of trial court judges.
Today, Texas judges receive higher compensation than the fifty-state average but lag behind the compensation paid to judges by other large states in judicial compensation.
This paper advocates a modernization of the Texas courts that will improve efficiency and establish a trial-assignment system that will coherently and rationally place legal proceedings before judges best able to conduct those proceedings. The paper contemplates that, for example, a family law case will be assigned to a judge whose career has provided him or her with knowledge and experience in that area of the law. Similarly, the paper envisions that a district judge who has experience in practice and on the bench in criminal matters would be assigned important or difficult criminal cases.
For the same reason, this paper recommends that court reorganization include a system to properly assign complex civil litigation to judges who have the background and ability to handle litigation that needs specialized knowledge, extraordinary attention, or intensive management. Four options for selecting the court or judge to handle complex cases are available. In this section, we state those options and summarize of the relative merits of each.
In the following sections, we discuss particular topics, like jurisdiction and venue, that impact the various alternative methods for handling complex lawsuits.
Additionally, unless the Constitution is amended to allow the appointment of these judges, they would have to be elected by the voters in their regions. A significant reason for having complex litiga tion courts is to guarantee that difficult civil cases are handled by the most capable and knowledgeable judges, but it is proven that popular election produces uneven results in the quality of judges.
Furthermore, because there would be only a few complex litigation courts, the election campaigns for these courts, for good or ill, probably would draw significant interest—and campaign contributions—from attorneys and actual or potential litigants who routinely are involved in complex litigation.
Finally, creating new elected positions in Texas requires pre-clearance from the United States Department of Justice under the Voting Rights Act, which would not be required if existing courts were designated to handle complex cases. Second, the Legislature could amend specific sections of Chapter 24 of the Government Code to designate existing district courts as complex litigation courts, which is similar to its designation of district courts as family, civil, or criminal courts.
This option would allow the Legislature to identify specific judges who have the experience and knowledge to handle complex cases, and to identify specific courts having the time and resources to support complex litigation. It also would allow the Legislature to adjust the number of complex litigation courts from time to time as needed to handle the caseload.
But it also would require that the Legislature reevaluate complex court designations during each biennial legislative session. And, because of the difficulties intrinsic to passing legislation, there is no guarantee that the complex court designations would be changed in a timely manner as circumstances change. As most legislators surely would agree, the Legislature probably is not well suited to making judgments about the relative abilities of trial judges.
Third, the Legislature could empower the Supreme Court to designate existing district courts as complex litigation courts. This alternative provides desirable flexibility.
The Supreme Court, as supervisor of the Office of Court Administration, is in a good position to determine the number of courts needed to handle the caseload and to identify judges having the skills necessary to handle complex cases. Additionally, the Court, which functions year-around, has the ability to change complex court designations to immediately address the retirement, death or defeat of judges handling complex cases. This paper consistently recommends that the Texas judiciary should be subject to the administrative control of the Supreme Court, and having the Supreme Court involved in the assignation of complex trial courts is consistent with that recommendation.
The MDL Panel evaluates the motion and either grants it and orders that the case be transferred to a specified court for pretrial proceedings, or denies it, in which event the case remains in the court in which it was filed. In the context of complex litigation, the procedure would be the same—any party could request that the Complex Litigation Panel, which would be comprised of five judges appointed by the Supreme Court, transfer a case to an appropriate complex litigation trial court for further proceedings.
The Panel then would decide, subject to rules promulgated by the Supreme Court, whether the case is complex. If so, the Panel would order the case transferred to an appropriate trial court to handle further proceedings in that case. Allowing an MDL-like panel to determine whether a case is complex and to select courts on an ad hoc basis provides more flexibility than any other option, but maintains administrative control by the Supreme Court through the exercise of its rule-making function and its appointment of judges to the Panel.
Whether existing district courts are used or new courts are created, the kinds of cases the courts will handle must be defined. Arizona also includes whether: 1 the case would benefit from permanent assignment to a judge who had acquired a substantial body of knowledge in a specific area of the law;. California provisionally designates as complex: antitrust or trade regulation claims, construction defect claims involving many parties or structures, securities claims or investment losses involving many parties, environmental or toxic tort claims involving many parties, claims involving mass torts, claims involving class actions, and insurance coverage claims arising out of any of these.
In Connecticut, the Complex Litigation Docket is designed for cases involving multiple litigants, legally intricate issues, lengthy trials or claims for damages that could total millions of dollars. By this definition, Connecticut recognizes that a variety of criteria, some of which are unrelated to the claims presented, may make a case complex. The criteria used by other states for determining if a case is complex require that a judge exercise discretion in making the determination.
Thus, these definitions, and the wide discretion they afford, are not suited for use in a jurisdiction statute, which would be required if new courts are created, because a jurisdiction statute must be precise enough to allow courts and litigants to easily determine whether a court has jurisdiction. Obviously, basing jurisdiction on an amount in controversy requires that a somewhat arbitrary amount of money be prescribed.
Consequently, comprehensive information is not available to determine how many cases are filed each year seeking a particular amount.
Additionally, jurisdiction based solely on the amount in controversy does not capture all litigation that reasonably could be considered complex. Complex litigation courts have jurisdiction of: 1 a case in which the matter in controversy exceeds an amount determined by the supreme court to be appropriate, 2 a case in which a party seeks certification of a class, 3 a shareholder derivative action, 4 a products liability action as defined in Section This definition is both over and under-inclusive.
Not all products liability or health care liability cases, for example, are complex, but all would be handled by complex litigation courts. On the other hand, a case having multiple parties or that presents novel or complicated scientific or technical issues may be complex, but those cases would not be handled by complex litigation courts.
Any attempt to define complex litigation in a jurisdiction statute will present similar problems. The Court has the expertise necessary to craft a rule distinguishing between complex cases and other cases, and, if its definition proves unsatisfactory, it can easily amend the rule.
The statute could give the Supreme Court complete discretion, or it could provide that certain kinds of cases must be transferred to a complex litigation court.
The following two alternatives are examples of what a statute might provide. The rules must provide that the following factors are to be considered when determining whether a case is complex: 1 whether there are a large number of separately represented parties, 2 whether coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other counties, states or nations, or in a federal court, will be necessary, 3 whether the case will benefit from assignment to a judge who is knowledgeable in a specific area of the law, 4 whether it is likely that there will be numerous pretrial motions or pretrial.
On the other hand, if the transfer is accomplished through an MDL-like panel, the definition should leave reasonable discretion to that panel. If new complex litigation courts are created, one challenge is estimating the number of courts to create. If the number of filings remains constant, and five percent of the new non-show cause filings meet the definition of complex case, the complex litigation courts would receive 32, cases per year.
If two percent are complex cases, the courts would receive 13, cases per year. If each court disposed of complex cases per year and 32, complex cases are filed each year, sixty-four new judges would be required to dispose of those cases.
If 13, complex cases are filed each year, twenty-six new judges would be required. The new judges would be doing work normally done by district and county court at law judges. Currently sitting judges could be appointed to complex litigation courts and existing courts could be dissolved so that the total number of trial courts would remain unchanged.
Whether new courts are created or existing courts are used, an issue that must be resolved is whether the court will draw cases from the county in which it sits, from a multi-county district, or from throughout the State. One factor to consider in resolving this question is to determine the purpose these courts will serve. Would the courts be intended to help multicourt counties better manage their dockets, or to allow litigants in complex cases across the state to access courts having greater resources and more expertise in handling complex litigation?
If the purpose is the former, only local transfers are necessary and the geographic scope of the complex litigation court would be the county in which the court sits. If the purpose is the latter, the complex litigation courts should have regional or statewide territories so any complex case, no matter where filed, could be transferred to a complex litigation court.
While local docket management is a good reason to have complex litigation courts, the greater purpose is to provide the expertise, knowledge and resources necessary to allow the judicial system and the litigants to efficiently process complex litigation. The more extensive the area covered by a complex litigation system, the larger the pool of capable judges available to serve as a complex litigation judge.
If regional or statewide districts are used, all complex cases will have a greater opportunity to access a highly skilled judge. Limited local transfer within a single county , on the other hand, might prevent complex cases from accessing courts with the capability to handle those kinds of lawsuits, especially in the smaller counties. Texas, however, is a large state and statewide transfer of cases may not be practical. Moreover, the public has a recognizable interest in seeing cases properly filed in a geographic area resolved in that area.
Thus, when deciding whether to draw judges from a local, regional or statewide pool one must consider the interest of the public, the courts and the litigants. Drawing judges only from a local pool ignores the potential interest of litigants and the court in efficiently managing complex litigation. Drawing judges from a statewide pool fails to account for the interest of the public in seeing cases resolved in the area where they are properly filed.
If complex litigation courts operate on a regional or statewide basis, venue must be considered. Texas has a number of mandatory venue statutes.
Texas also has a number of permissive venue statutes. Texas allows venue transfers in civil cases under several circumstances. Venue Considerations for Complex Courts. If complex cases are transferred to either existing district courts or new complex litigation courts and regional or statewide operation is permitted, these courts often will not be in a county of proper venue as currently defined by statute.
Thus, the transfer from a district court in a county of proper venue to a complex litigation district court would be a transfer between two courts of proper venue. Alternatively, the venue problem could be avoided if complex cases were transferred to a complex litigation district court for pretrial proceedings only, and returned to the original county for trial, as is done with cases transferred for coordinated pretrial proceedings under the multi-district litigation procedure.
Texas law currently requires that a jury be drawn from the county in which the case is pending. If region-wide juries are permitted, the region cannot be too large or it becomes impractical to draw a jury from the entire district. The federal district court system provides a model. Texas is divided into four federal districts and subdivided into twenty-seven multi-county divisions.
Most of the courts are located in major metropolitan areas and, in most instances, jurors do not have to travel more than miles to attend court. The federal court system divides Texas into twenty-seven divisions, but some jurors still must travel over miles to attend court. Complex litigation court districts built on the fourteen court of appeals districts present the problem that some jurors would have to travel several hundred miles to attend trial, which could necessitate breaking the districts into divisions, as is done in the federal judicial system.
Of course, the problem of drawing a multi-county jury is eliminated if complex cases are returned to their originating counties for trial and the jury is drawn from that county as in any other case. If existing courts are used as complex litigation courts, a procedural mechanism for transferring cases to those courts must be created.
There are four possible procedures: 1 a motion to transfer filed in the court in which the case is pending; 2 a motion to transfer filed with the regional administrative judge; 3 removal of cases to a complex litigation court, subject to remand; or 4 a complex litigation transfer panel to receive motions to transfer. If new courts are created, cases will arrive in the courts one of two ways. The plaintiff could file the case in the complex litigation court, or the defendant could remove the case to the complex litigation court.
Moving Cases if Existing Courts are Used. The simplest method to achieve the transfer of a complex case to an existing court designated as a complex litigation court is to require a motion requesting a transfer be filed in the court in which the case is pending. A specific definition coupled with a right to transfer would eliminate the ability of the court system to exercise administrative flexibility over this process, and complex litigation courts would be required to accept all transferred cases without regard to their ability to handle the cases and without regard to whether the cases, in fact, were complex.
As an alternative, the motion to transfer could be filed with the regional administrative judge. If given the authority to do so, the regional administrative judge could exercise discretion in transferring cases based on the caseloads and expertise of the complex litigation district courts in the region.
Thus, if the regional administrative judge determined that a particular district court had capacity for an additional case and the ability to handle it, the regional administrative judge could transfer the case to that court.
If no court had capacity or ability, the administrative judge could deny the transfer. The regional administrative judge also could consider the location of witnesses and counsel in making the transfer decision.
Additionally, specific district courts would have to be designated as complex litigation courts to which cases could be removed, and a strict geographic structure also would have to be in place to prevent parties from removing cases to their favorite complex litigation court.
Again, this procedure does not provide the desirable degree of administrative flexibility. Either way, the panel could be empowered to transfer complex cases to district courts throughout the state or within a region. In other words, an MDL-like panel may be used whether statewide or regional transfers are permitted. A MDL-like panel would have the same flexibility as regional administrative judges, but would have the additional advantage of having statewide authority, if a statewide mechanism is authorized.
The advantage over using the regional administrative judges is that power would not be concentrated in a single administrative judge, but would be given to a panel. Still, it would be necessary to require that the Supreme Court develop procedures for the panel to use in transferring cases and to give the Supreme Court administrative oversight of the Panel. The currently existing MDL Panel is comprised of five judges, designated by the Supreme Court, who must be active court of appeals justices or administrative judges.
Any complex litigation transfer panel could be expected to receive numerous transfer motions. That panel, whether it is a new panel or the MDL Panel is used, must be funded adequately to do its work. The panel should have a sufficient appropriation to employ administrative and professional staff and to operate and equip an office appropriate to its work.
If new courts are created and jurisdiction is defined solely by amount in controversy, the complex litigation courts would have concurrent jurisdiction with the district courts for all complex cases. The Legislature could specify the procedure for removal and remand, but it would be better for the Legislature to delegate the task of providing the removal and remand procedure to the Supreme Court. If new complex litigation courts were created, but no currently existing courts dissolved to make room for them in the budget for the judiciary, the State would have an additional financial burden in funding the judicial system.
If existing courts were used, it would be important for the Legislature to appropriate sufficient funds to allow the designated courts to hire administrative and professional personnel to assist those courts in handling complex cases. This paper recommends that the following steps be taken for handling complex litigation in Texas:.
The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of practice and proce dure specifying the types of cases to be transferred by the Complex and Multidistrict Litigation Panel to a trial court for treatment as a complex case. The rules must provide that the following factors are to be considered when determining whether a case is complex: 1 whether there are a large number of separately represented parties, 2 whether coordination with related actions pending in one or more courts in other coun ties, states or nations, or in a federal court, will be necessary, 3 whether the case will benefit from assignment to a judge who is knowledgeable in a specific area of the law, 4 whether it is likely that there will benumerous pretrial motions or pretrial motions will raise difficult or novel legal issues that will be time consuming to resolve, 5 whether it is likely that there will be a large number of witnesses or a substantial amount of documentary evidence, 6 whether it is likely that substantial postjudgment judicial supervision will be required.
From the top to the bottom of the Texas judicial system, there are peculiarities, inconsistencies and complexities. Texas is the only state in the nation having trial courts that answer to more than one intermediate appellate court.
It is the only state in the nation having intermediate appellate courts with overlapping geographic boundaries. It is one of only two states in the nation having two high courts. Its small claims courts do not have jurisdiction of the smallest claims, unless the Texas Constitution is ignored.
It has gone from a rational three-tier structure in to a Byzantine multi-tier structure today. It is time for comprehensive reform and reorganization of the Texas judicial system. We recognize that this will take extraordinary commitment by government officials throughout our state. The reward for their efforts, however, will be a rationally organized, professional, efficient litigation system that will benefit all future generations of Texans. See id. Probate Court No. See App. State, Tex.
State courts are the final arbiters of state laws and constitutions. Their interpretation of federal law or the U. Constitution may be appealed to the U. Supreme Court. The Supreme Court may choose to hear or not to hear such cases. Court Structure. Selection of Judges. Types of Cases Heard. State court judges are selected in a variety of ways, including election, appointment for a given number of years, appointment for life, and combinations of these methods, e.
Cases that deal with the constitutionality of a law; Cases involving the laws and treaties of the U. Court Information. Helpful Non-Legal Organizations. Types of Legal Help. Legal Assistance. Find Help. Legal Help Directory. Qualifying for Legal Aid.
Working with Private Attorneys. Professional Use Only Forms. Search Search. All text below reproduced from the US Courts website. Court Structure: Federal Courts vs. State Courts The U.
To further understand the Federal Courts, click here for the packet from uscourts. Supreme Court and gives Congress the authority to create the lower federal courts. Congress has used this power to establish the 13 U.
Courts of Appeals, the 94 U. District Courts, the U. Court of Claims, and the U.
0コメント